Elements of a Real Policy for Change in South Africa

The Reagan Administration has gone to considerable lengths to emphasize that U.S. policy toward Southern Africa is undergoing a major review. Whether such a review is overdue is beside the point; what is certain is its necessity. The alternative is to expect a future in which the United States is increasingly divided at home and on the defensive abroad.

The initial phase of the Reagan Administration’s Southern Africa policy lasted about five years. It constituted a break with the Carter Administration tendency to criticize publicly the Republic of South Africa; more important, the focus was shifted from the South African internal situation to the region at large. The dismantling of apartheid was placed on the back burner. The independence of Namibia and the ousting of Cuban soldiers from Angola became the immediate aim of “constructive engagement.”

Despite strenuous diplomacy, the effort failed. Pretoria would not play; Namibian independence was not to be. Meanwhile, the dynamics of civil war in Angola were such that the central government never believed that it could agree to Cuban withdrawal and survive a South African-backed insurgency.

The result is that the Administration has little to show for its exertions. Critics of the policy can claim with some cause that constructive engagement has accomplished little in the region while ignoring one of the major human-rights problems of our time. The critics’ reaction has been to push for a set of largely economic sanctions designed to weaken apartheid.

The Administration is resisting sanctions, arguing that such measures would be irrelevant or worse--hurting black workers and driving the South African establishment further into a “circle-the-wagons” mentality. Yet the Administration is losing the battle; as is often the case, it is not easy to beat something with nothing.

What, then, can be done? Three policies come to mind:

--Congress is intent on introducing punitive measures. The Administration should reconsider its outright opposition, and instead work to refine whatever sanctions are passed, ensuring their linkage to specific reforms. An effort should be made to avoid measures that would most directly hurt black workers. Total divestiture, a step that would create a fire sale of U.S. assets at prices far below their true worth, should be resisted. Strengthening guidelines for American firms doing business in the country, providing direct aid to black citizens and townships and expanding our military assistance (now limited to Botswana) to other neighboring “front-line states” should also be considered.

--The United States ought to promote an expanded dialogue between the government and its opponents. Important South African figures--including business, religious and academic leaders--are talking with the African National Congress and other black leaders. Pretoria should, too.

--The level and frequency of U.S. talks with black South African leaders should be raised. Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker, or a more senior State Department official, could travel to Africa for this purpose. Sending a black American as ambassador might help as well.

None of these policies promise a breakthrough. Sanctions could well prove irrelevant and counterproductive, increasing Afrikaner stubbornness and black poverty. Prospects for internal dialogue are poor; the gap between white and black is vast, and neither the government in Pretoria nor the ANC leadership can speak with unchallenged authority. Finally, both the black nationalists and the front-line states may reject increased U.S. contacts as too little, too late.

Nevertheless, it is important that we try all three approaches. If not, the Administration will surely find itself under fire at home and abroad. Perhaps more important, time and isolation will not moderate the leftist-leaning black leadership that one day is likely to rule South Africa.

We cannot act unilaterally. Our allies have a large economic stake in the region; it is important that any U.S. initiative be coordinated with the Europeans. Administration policy cannot succeed without building a consensus with Congress, nor can it work without the direct involvement of the President.

Opposition to sanctions is no more a policy than is opposition to apartheid. President Reagan must make it clear in a major address that the United States favors change, that the change should be nonviolent and that our objective is not simply to bring down apartheid but to replace it with true democracy. Such an approach will not solve the South African morass, but it will position us to influence developments more than either constructive engagement or sanctions alone.